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Hybrid Pathways to Orthodoxy in Brunei 
Darussalam: Bureaucratised Exorcism, 
Scientisation and the Mainstreaming of 
Deviant-Declared Practices 
Dominik M. Müller 
Abstract: This article investigates the bureaucratisation of Islam in Bru-
nei and its interlinkages with socio-cultural changes. It elucidates how 
realisations of state-enforced Islamic orthodoxy and purification produce 
locally unique meanings, while simultaneously reflecting much broader 
characteristics of the contemporary global condition. The article first 
introduces a theoretical perspective on the bureaucratisation of Islam as 
a social phenomenon that is intimately intertwined with the state’s exer-
cise of classificatory power and related popular processes of co-pro-
ducing, and sometimes appropriating symbolic state power. Second, it 
outlines the historical trajectory of empowering Brunei’s national ideolo-
gy, Melayu Islam Beraja (MIB). It then explores social imaginaries and 
bureaucratic representations of “deviant”-declared practices, before illus-
trating how these practices become reinvented within the parameters of 
state power as “Sharia-compliant” services to the nation state. Simulta-
neously, national-religious protectionism is paradoxically expressed in 
thoroughly globalised terms and shaped by forces the state cannot (en-
tirely) control. Newly established Sharia-serving practices become cultur-
ally re-embedded, while also flexibly drawing upon multiple transnational 
cultural registers. In the main ethnographic example, bureaucratised 
exorcism, Japanese water-crystal photography and scientisation fuse 
behind the “firewall” of MIB. These hybrid pathways to orthodoxy 
complicate the narratives through which they are commonly framed. 
  Manuscript received 9 February 2018; accepted 13 April 2018 
Keywords: Brunei, Islam and the State, bureaucracy, classificatory power, 
exorcism, globalisation 
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Introduction 
The cultural and political position of Islam in contemporary Brunei Da-
russalam (henceforth Brunei) is commonly perceived as conservative and 
orthodox. 1 Indeed, the government’s powerful Islamic Religious Council 
and its Legal Committee de jure follow “the orthodox tenets” of Sunni 
Islam (of the Shafi’i legal school2) in their rulings. Beyond the Sultanate’s 
shores, portrayals of Brunei as a vanguard of Islamisation in Asia have 
become increasingly prominent since 2013/2014, following a series of 
international media reports, according to which the Sultan (sic) had sud-
denly (sic) decided to implement the Sharia (sic).3 Over the past three 
decades the government has undeniably formalised an increasingly re-
strictive state-brand of Islam, with far-reaching social consequences. 
Personal liberties in the religious field are more limited than in neigh-
bouring countries, and the government zealously aims to transform its 
                                                 
1  Research for this article was supported by the German Research Foundation’s 
Emmy Noether Program, the Max Planck Institute for Social Anthropology’s 
Department “Law & Anthropology”, the National University of Singapore’s 
Centre for Asian Legal Studies, and Harvard University’s “Islamic Legal Studies 
Program: Law and Social Change”. I would like to thank Michael Peletz, Law-
rence Rosen and the anonymous reviewer for their comments on an earlier 
draft. I am indebted to my Bruneian interlocutors, and most grateful for the ex-
ceptional openness of the Ministry of Religious Affairs, the MIB Supreme 
Council’s Secretariat, and Darusysyifa’ Warrafahah, each of whom helped me 
with my research and gave me access to documents and data, while tolerating, 
as we spoke about explicitly, that my interpretations will likely differ from some 
of their positions. All faults are my own. 
2  Exceptions are possible where following the “orthodox tenets” opposes “pub-
lic interest”, and where His Majesty directs otherwise. Then, the “less orthodox 
tenets” of Sunni Shafi’i Islam should be applied. If even those contradict public 
interest or the Sultan’s orders, the Islamic Religious Council, headed by the Sul-
tan, can refer to other Sunni legal schools (Religious Council and Kadis Courts 
Act, RCKCA, Article 43). 
3  The legal reform was planned since the 1990s, largely unnoticed outside of 
Brunei (Müller 2015: 323). In 2011, the Sultan announced its imminent comple-
tion, asking rhetorically “Who are we to say wait?”, much cited in Brunei and 
Malaysia. Yet, in 2013/2014, when international media finally discovered their 
story, observers appeared puzzled why the Sultan “suddenly wants to imple-
ment the Sharia”. Notably, not “the Sultan”, but a complex assemblage of insti-
tutions, individuals and working groups had prepared and publicly and non-
publicly argued for the reform, to which he “consented”, although not every-
body even in the state apparatus had been aware of these preparations (indeed, 
even some state elites were taken by surprise). Similarly, “the Sharia” was not 
“introduced”, but an existing Sharia legislation was transformed/expanded. 
The reform is still in its first stage (Müller 2017). 
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citizenry into obedient religious subjects adhering to state-defined doc-
trines. However, generalised narratives of “growing Islamisation” and 
“orthodoxy” tell us little about the actual empirical realities, social mean-
ings and discursive embeddedness of Brunei’s “Islamisation” policies, 
and how different actors position themselves towards and within these 
processes. In the context of Brunei, such questions have so far received 
little scholarly attention, even among experts of Islam in Southeast Asia. 
This article ethnographically explores state-enforced Islamisation 
policies in post-colonial Brunei vis-à-vis parallel socio-legal and cultural 
transformations.4 As we shall see, the pathways to state-enforced ortho-
doxy and its social realisation can be remarkably flexible and culturally 
hybrid. This challenges not only essentialising narratives about “Islamisa-
tion” and “the Sharia” in Brunei, but also has implications for our under-
standing of developments elsewhere that are framed in similar terms in 
scholarly and media representations. Such explanatory schemes may 
obscure more than they reveal, and to generate a deeper understanding 
of the complex dynamics at play, we should examine them where they 
take place – that is, in the spheres of everyday life – ideally by looking 
“over the shoulders” (Geertz 1973: 452) of involved actors. As my case 
study will demonstrate, developments of assumed Islamisation and 
growing orthodoxy are shaped by and need to be understood vis-à-vis 
their unique settings. The closer we examine them, the more our findings 
may challenge dominant assumptions about the phenomena these terms 
aim to signify.  
I start by introducing theoretical considerations pertaining to the 
bureaucratisation of Islam as a social phenomenon that transcends its 
institutional boundaries, informs cultural change, and is inherent to the 
state’s exercise of classificatory power. In a second step, I sketch the 
historical trajectory and institutional empowerment of Brunei’s official 
national ideology (Melayu Islam Beraja, MIB) and state-brand of Islam. I 
then ethnographically elucidate social imaginaries and bureaucratic repre-
sentations of supernatural powers and deviant-declared practices such as 
magic healing and exorcism, before illustrating how such practices be-
come reinvented within the symbolic parameters of bureaucratised state 
power, while simultaneously drawing upon other interlinked cultural 
registers, including Islamic legalism, objectification/rationalisation, glob-
                                                 
4  Most names other than public figures are pseudonyms, and some circumstantial 
information has been changed to protect identities. All translations are the au-
thor’s. I have slightly altered some of my interlocutors’ wording for better read-
ability. Some citations have been recorded, others are based on fieldnotes. 
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alisation, marketisation, and the transnational “conservative turn” 5  in 
Southeast Asian Islam. This hybrid reconfiguration of outlawed tradi-
tions gives rise to novel cultural forms. In the main ethnographic exam-
ple to be addressed, all of these forces are at play, as “Sharia-compliant” 
exorcism, Japanese water-crystal photography and the quest for scientific 
evidence-making enter into a symbiotic relationship behind the self-
declared “firewall” of Melayu Islam Beraja. I will conclude that some newly 
established Sharia-serving practices have become re-embedded in a pre-
existing symbolic vocabulary while simultaneously drawing upon trans-
national cultural flows that are creatively appropriated from multiple 
sources and, in many ways, reflect the contemporary global condition. 
New cultural forms arising from such appropriations are likely transitory, 
like many hybridities that serve as “instable forms of mediation and dis-
tinction” between local and global spheres (Hahn 2016). Yet, they 
demonstrate how the pathways to Brunei’s state-enforced orthodoxy, at 
a deeper symbolic level, tell a quite different story from the narratives of 
Islamisation, purification and national cultural protectionism through 
which they are framed. 
Bureaucratic Meaning-Making, Classificatory 
Power and the Nation-Stateisation of Islam: 
Conceptual Considerations  
This article departs from an anthropological perspective that conceptual-
ises the bureaucratisation of Islam (henceforth BoI) as a social phenom-
enon that transcends its organisational boundaries, as categorical 
schemes of Islam diffuse into society and become appropriated by social 
actors and institutions (Müller 2018). In settings, such as Brunei, where 
governments have empowered Islamic institutions to influence the direc-
tion Muslim discourse is taking in their territories, the BoI often pene-
trates deeply into public discourse and everyday life in society. Therefore, 
the BoI is not simply a formalisation, expansion and diversification of 
Islamic institutions, or a government attempt to control religious actors 
and neutralise opposition, as it is often conceived of in functional terms. 
Instead, as a multi-dimensional phenomenon, it also affects dynamics of 
social and cultural transformations, although it does not simply deter-
mine them. The BoI goes along with a bureaucratisation of knowledge and 
                                                 
5  Van Bruinessen 2013. “Conservative” should not be misread as indicating the 
conservation of an actually existing previous condition; rather, it is often a 
transformative and future-oriented project (cf. Feener 2013). 
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related processes of systematising and reflecting, which Eickelman (1992, 
2015: 605) calls an “objectification of Muslim consciousness”, resulting 
in “a significant reimagining of religious and political identities”.6 Ac-
cordingly, the BoI implies distinct epistemic modes of understanding and 
organising the world. These often fuse with other registers, such as cul-
tural marketisation, the punitive turn (Peletz 2015), and other transna-
tional flows, alongside discursive frames of the nation state, which result 
in novel cultural forms and social meanings of Islam and being Muslim.  
The BoI is entrenched in the empowerment of what Bourdieu 
(1994: 13) called “state forms of classification” and their “social frame-
works of perceptions”, “understanding”, “appreciation” and “memory”, 
which are inscribed to varying extents to the spheres of habitus. There-
fore, the state’s classificatory power is not simply produced by state ac-
tors in the term’s conventional sense, but co-produced and contested in society 
(Müller 2018), while the boundaries between state- and non-state spheres 
are blurring (Gupta 1995). In certain contexts, non-state actors thus 
become state-actors as well. Accordingly, symbolic power, of which state 
power and state-imposed social classification are manifestations,7 “pre-
supposes, on the part of those who submit to it, a form of complicity 
which is neither passive submission nor a free adherence to it” (Bourdieu 
1991: 50–51). Social actors within and beyond the bureaucracy position 
themselves in diverse ways: they do not simply internalise state-clas-
sification to a “taken-for-granted” and “commonsensical” level (Han-
delman and Shamgar-Handelman 1991: 294), or circumvent, pragmati-
cally adapt, subversively resist, or cautiously navigate between “public” 
and “hidden transcripts” (Scott 1985, 1990), although all of this likely 
occurs and affects individual subject formations. Of most relevance to 
the present article, they also ascribe their own meanings to the hegemonic 
discourse and creatively re-signify it, which is only partly conditioned by 
its embeddedness in existing power-knowledge regimes. Although actors 
may submit to symbolic state power and participate in its social produc-
tion, they may still actively (often even unintentionally) inform some of 
                                                 
6  Following this concept, Islam “has implicitly been systematised […] in the 
popular imagination, making it self-contained and facilitating innovation. Ques-
tions such as ‘What is my religion?’, ‘Why is it important to my life?’, and ‘How 
do my beliefs guide my conduct?’ have become foregrounded in the lives of 
large numbers of believers […] These transformations also mean that ‘authen-
tic’ religious tradition and identity are foregrounded”, but also “questioned, and 
constructed rather than taken for granted” (Eickelman 2015: 605). 
7  Similarly, Herzfeld (1992: 38) viewed “(s)tate order” as “the most massively 
organised and systematically controlled symbolic system that the world has so 
far known”, echoing Bourdieu’s notion of state power as symbolic power.  
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its contents in ways that were originally unanticipated by the ruling or-
der’s creators. 
This article illustrates such creative state-making with the example 
of an Islamic healing centre that incorporates the symbolic language and 
categorical schemes of state power in Brunei. The centre specialises in 
exorcism, which had long been the domain of Malay supernatural spe-
cialists (bomoh) whose once-normalised practices have become bureau-
cratically classified as deviant (sesat) in the post-colonial state (Müller 
2015); growing segments of the population have internalised this posi-
tion as commonsensical Islamic. In this context, the BoI in Brunei af-
fects cultural changes in the normativities of everyday life, but it also 
informs social agency and its creative realisations of the state. The agency 
behind the establishment of this Islamic healing centre problematises 
wide-spread notions about Brunei society being “apathetic” (Horton 
2004: 274), which continue to dominate perceptions of the country.8 
Another conceptual point of reference pertains to paradoxical, une-
ven continuities in the Brunei government’s self-declared path towards 
religious purifying Malay culture, or what Herzfeld calls in more abstract 
terms “the organic part played by symbols in creating the new order out 
of the old” (Herzfeld 1992: 35). Transformations presented as radical 
shifts may, on a deeper level, not always be what they purport to be. 
Herzfeld (1992: 25–26, 42) provided the example of sudden changes 
towards new state ideologies, such as Kemalist secularism in early 20th 
century Turkey. In its proclaimed abandonment of public religious sym-
bols, this “non-religious” regime of “secular modernisation” appropriat-
ed religion-like symbols into a new nationalist culture, although these 
were neither intended to appear, nor consciously perceived, as religious. 
While some forms change, “others will probably persist, if not as exter-
nal symbolic forms, then as structures of thought that will continue to 
provide an organizing framework for people trying to come to terms 
with change” (Herzfeld 1992: 57). New normative projects “batten on to 
an existing cultural vocabulary”,9 allowing people to “make their respec-
tive accommodations to this new order” (Herzfeld 1992: 57). In Brunei, 
where spirit beliefs, sorcery, exorcism and consultation with supernatural 
specialists had long been a “widely accepted symbolism” (to borrow 
                                                 
8  The idea that Bruneian society is “apathetic” may have more to do with con-
ventions of explaining Brunei. Very few studies illustrate popular agency, but 
signs of change are in the air (Zawawi and Amalina 2017; Chin 2017; Tolman 
2018). 
9  To avoid misunderstandings, it should be noted that obviously, no cultural 
vocabulary is stable or isolated. 
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Herzfeld’s 1992: 58 wording), the state-policy towards establishing an 
Islamic order in a complete (lengkap, Muhammad Hadi 2017a) manner 
became similarly re-embedded. Before going into further ethnographic 
and analytic detail, however, it is important to provide some contextual 
information. 
Bureaucratised Islam and Classificatory Power 
in the “MIB State”  
Brunei has been conceptualised by its government as non-secular “Islam-
ic State” (Negara Islam10) and, more specifically, a “Malay Islamic Monar-
chy” (Melayu Islam Beraja), since Independence in 1984. The country 
never established a parliamentary democracy and the charismatic mon-
arch, Sultan Hassanal Bolkiah (who has held office since 1967) embodies 
state power more than any other Southeast Asian leader. In the spirit of 
l’état c’est moi, he is the prime minister, minister of finance, minister of 
defence, minister of foreign affairs and trade, commander-in-chief of the 
army and police, university chancellor, holds absolute executive powers, 
and is “head of the official religion” (ketua ugama rasmi, Constitution, 
Article 3(2)); that is, Islam (Figure 1).  
Constitutionally, the Sultan “can do no wrong in either his personal 
or any official capacity” (Constitution, Article 84(B1)). De jure, no 
checks-and-balances limit his powers, although de facto he constantly 
needs to stage and reactualise the legitimacy of his rule and integrate 
various interest groups, including the religious bureaucracy, to ensure 
their support. 
The Sultan enjoys enormous popularity11 and, as Bourdieu notes on 
states more generally, personally serves as the country’s “(central) bank of 
symbolic capital”.12 This popularity is not just fostered, choreographed 
and demanded by state-controlled media but also an undeniable (in a 
double-sense) social fact that contributes to upholding the political status 
quo. 
                                                 
10  The Sultan regularly stresses that Brunei “is an Islamic State” (e.g. cited in 
Jabatan Penerangan 2017). Cf. Shukri Zain 1996. 
11  This is, at least, my own perception based on regular visits since 2007. Cf. 
Lindsey and Steiner 2016: 553. 
12  He strikingly resembles the “President” acting as the Mauss’ian “sorcerer” in 
Bourdieu’s (1994: 11–12) essay on the “bureaucratic field”, also pertaining to 
the “monopoly over nomination”. 
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Figure 1. Sultan Hassanal Bolkiah’s 71st Birthday Celebrations (Hari  
Keputeraan ke-71). Bandar Seri Begawan 
 
Source:  Picture by Dominik M. Müller, 2017. 
Another stabilising factor is the oil- and gas-funded high living standards. 
The Sultan is widely considered to have personally provided Brunei’s 
welfare state in his capacity as a “caring/benevolent monarch” (raja yang 
prihatin/pemedulian), discoursively naturalised terms that are normative for 
public speech. Poems and patriotic songs, such as those played in state-
media during the Sultan’s three week-long birthday celebrations, similarly 
emphasise his benevolence and artistically reproduce the caring monarch 
motif. And with compelling arguments: There is no personal income tax, 
a pension is provided for all citizens from the age of 60, education and 
medical services are largely free (except private clinics), and the state 
provides numerous social services. 
The “hierarchical reciprocal relationship between the ruler and his 
subjects” (Siti Norkhalbi 2005: 247) is also framed in culturalist and 
primordialist terms as representing a “traditional” Malay principle ac-
cording to which “the ruler must be just, the people must be loyal” (Pe-
lita Brunei 2017, translation). Despite standing “above the law” (Siti 
Norkhalbi 2005: 13), the Sultan is not perceived as an arbitrary ruler or 
dictator by any significant grouping of citizens. With his promotion of 
the rule of law, justice and accountability, his rule comes closer to what 
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Turner (2015) calls soft-authoritarianism in the Singaporean context. To 
be sure, the media-scape is controlled and ideologically streamlined, and 
Brunei witnessed six decades of systematically de-politicising the popula-
tion following a rebellion in 1962. Also, Brunei’s small population 
(420,000 inhabitants) adds to its controllability. 
Institutionalising a National Ideology:  
Melayu Islam Beraja 
The government seeks to instil the values of Brunei’s official national 
ideology (ideologi negara, also “national philosophy”) Melayu Islam Beraja 
(MIB) in the population’s minds. MIB privileges Malay (Melayu) suprem-
acy, Islam (as interpreted by the state – no other Islam), and the monar-
chy (Beraja). As a bureaucratic categorical scheme, MIB is at the very 
heart of the state’s attempted exercise of classificatory power.  
Officially, MIB has been in place since the first Sultan converted to 
Islam, assumedly in 1368. Leaving aside discussions whether MIB is a 
“centuries old creed” (Borneo Bulletin 2013), an invented tradition for 
nation building (Braighlinn 1992), or possibly both, notably MIB propa-
gators readily admit the acronym’s inventedness, although its spirit 
would have been “practiced […] for more than 600 years as a way of life 
and source of unity and harmony” (Muhammad Hadi 2017b, translation). 
In the Declaration of Independence in 1984, the Sultan proclaimed 
Brunei “shall be forever a […] Malay, Muslim Monarchy upon the teachings of 
(Sunni) Islam” (Jabatan Penerangan 2017). MIB became gradually institu-
tionalised, and Brunei-specific notions of Melayu, Islam, and the monar-
chy became translated into the language of bureaucracy. In 1986, an MIB 
Concept Committee (Jawatankuasa Konsep MIB) was established, which 
transformed in 1990 into the MIB Supreme Council (Majlis Tertinggi MIB, 
originally Majlis Tertinggi Kebangsaan MIB). Its Secretariat is hosted by the 
Academy of Brunei Studies (Akademi Pengajian Brunei, APB) at the Uni-
versity of Brunei Darussalam. The APB was established in the same year, 
with overlapping purposes and personnel. This double-structure, a cru-
cial site for MIB knowledge-production, continues to exist today. In 
1991, compulsory MIB classes were established at the university, organ-
ised by the APB. For citizens, the MIB modules have become obligatory 
for obtaining degrees. In 1992, MIB became a compulsory school subject 
(it had been part of curricula since 1986, Dewan Majlis 2014: 469). The 
contents of MIB teaching have been modified over time – regrettably, no 
study has yet systematically examined this doctrinal meaning-production 
and its historical genesis. 
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The Supreme Council is responsible for defining, systematising and 
propagating MIB. It prepares curricula and teaching materials, alongside 
publications for the public. Systematic publishing began in 1994, alt-
hough texts conceptualising MIB existed earlier (e.g., Hashim 1987; 
Moehammad 1989; Kementerian Pendidikan 1992). Its Secretariat con-
stantly reminds citizens of their obligations towards the MIB State (Nega-
ra MIB, Dewan Majlis 2014: 271). One of its leaders, Muhammad Hadi 
Muhammad Melayong (2013), argues that MIB’s “values […] are innate 
for every Bruneian,” a descriptive claim and normative expectation. Simi-
larly, a former Minister of Education stated: “Every individual is respon-
sible for practicing, appreciating, and strengthening the concept of MIB” 
(Dewan Majlis 2014: 473) (Figure 2). 
Figure 2. Secretariat of the MIB Supreme Council, Located at the Universi-
ty of Brunei Darussalam’s Campus, Gadong 
 
Source:  Picture by Dominik M. Müller, 2014. 
The government insists on exclusively defining MIB – in the Secretariat’s 
words, its “interpretation must be protected” (Muhammad Hadi 2016, 
translation). MIB bureaucrats themselves reflect upon how its propaga-
tion has undergone reorientations; for example, MIB is now taught in a 
more interactive and activating manner, resembling transnational peda-
gogical trends. Learners should then become “multipliers”. In line with 
target-group adjusted marketing and evidence-oriented bureaucratic 
thinking, the Council tries to maximise quantified and measured “success 
rates” (Dewan Majlis 2014: 472–473, the author holds further statistics). 
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I have observed MIB teaching in 2014, where transnationally inspired 
up-to-date didactic methods were applied. Another new trend, as a for-
mer MIB lecturer told me, is, somewhat paradoxically, to encourage 
“critical thinking”: learners should reflect critically upon how they can 
strengthen the realisation of MIB in private and public life. MIB teaching 
now also extends to previously less explored fields, such as environment 
protection, which, as the same teacher argued, would be essentially Is-
lamic and Malay. 
Reflecting the language of bureaucracy, the Council operates with 
“five-year working plans”. The current plan (2015–2020) calls for further 
expansion of the MIB bureaucracy’s “human resources” and “infrastruc-
ture”, alongside other goals. The Secretariat distinguishes three propaga-
tion fields – educational sector, other institutions, and general public – 
and five target groups: government officers/staff, sub-district and village 
heads (as multipliers), youth/pupils/students, the private sector, and 
society at large. By educationally empowering these groups to themselves 
empower MIB in society, the authorities seek to make the BoI transcend 
its institutional boundaries: MIB should not simply be state-dictated and 
obeyed, but society should actively strengthen it, and thus co-produce 
the state’s classificatory power. As the Council also integrates other insti-
tutions and companies under its “multi-agency approach”, boundaries 
between state and society blur in many ways and the MIB State takes a 
paramount interest in fostering a state-in-society understanding of good 
citizenship. 
The Council’s outreach activities, which are often co-organised with 
other agencies and companies, include lectures/speeches, courses/work-
shops/seminars, forums/dialogues/discussions, briefings, exhibitions, 
roadshows, competitions (such as arts and poetry), camps, distributing 
publications, and propagation through state media.  
Thus, Bruneian citizens are extensively exposed to the MIB dis-
course and its normative expectations for public and private behaviour. 
They are not only subject to control and disciplining mechanisms, but 
also to the everyday didactics and contents of MIB discourse. Even those 
who circumvent or deliberately resist the state’s pedagogical aspirations 
can rarely evade being affected by its symbolic power and classification. 
For Bruneians below 40 – the generation that underwent MIB education 
– being MIB citizens and being expected to present themselves as such 
has become inscribed, to varying extents, into their habitus. This is often 
accompanied by hidden transcripts, negotiations and insecurities (also 
among MIB propagators); nevertheless, MIB discourse, which is integral 
to Brunei’s BoI, deeply penetrates their lifeworlds and subject formation. 
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Centralising Islamic Discourse: The Ministry of  
Religious Affairs and the State Mufti Department 
Unlike in other countries where Muslim institutional actors and interpre-
tations openly coexist and compete, Brunei has zero public space for 
non-state Islamic organisations or voices. The government and bureau-
cracy legally enjoy the exclusive right to publicly speak about and publish 
about Islam. Islamic scholars are, by definition, civil servants. Islam-
related publications from abroad are screened before they can be distrib-
uted, which can take months, as officers told me. As Iik (2002: 88) con-
cluded, religious policies “are discussed internally and [...] introduced 
slowly and quietly. Open religious […] debates have never taken place”. 
Earlier attempts to establish alternative Muslim groups were quickly 
cracked down on (Müller 2015: 317), with many becoming bureaucrati-
cally classified as “deviant teachings” (ajaran sesat, Norafan 2007). One 
exception, the supposedly apolitical Sunni orthodox Tablighi Jamaat, is 
not classified as deviant, but it cannot establish its own registered organi-
sation, mosques or media, and involved individuals are monitored. Oth-
ers, such as the Bahai and al-Arqam, faced sanctions up to imprisonment, 
“re-education”, and, in the Bahai’s case, a civil service employment ban 
in the past. 
The MIB Supreme Council is entrenched in a wider bureaucratic as-
semblage of institutions enacting so-called Islamisation policies. Its most 
powerful actors include the Ministry of Religious Affairs (MoRA, Kemen-
terian Hal Ehwal Ugama), the State Mufti Department (Jabatan Mufti Kera-
jaan), and the Islamic Religious Council (MUIB, Majlis Ugama Islam Bru-
nei). 
Initially called the Department of Religious Affairs (Jabatan Hal 
Ehwal Ugama), the MoRA was established by Sultan Omar Ali Saifuddin 
III in 1959. Its predecessor body (Badan Penasihat Ugama) was founded by 
Sultan Ahmad Tajuddin and served as the Sultan’s Mohammedan reli-
gious adviser. In 1954, Sultan Omar Ali Saifuddin III had already formed 
a consultative council for Sharia affairs (Majlis Mesyuarat Syariah); in 1955, 
he established the MUIB, which continues to serve as the “chief authori-
ty” in “all matters relating to religion” (Religious Council and Kadis 
Courts Act, RCKCA, Section 38) and belongs to the MoRA.  
The MoRA’s responsibilities include the building/maintenance of 
mosque, employing mosque personnel, compulsory Islamic education, 
pilgrimage matters, propagation (dakwah), conversions (and supporting 
converts), alms (zakat), handling religious offences (kesalahan ugama), 
“doctrine control”, halal certification, advice for families, prayer services, 
and cemeteries. It also manages the Sharia judiciary, which exists parallel 
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to a British-derived Civil judiciary. With a budget of BND 236 Mio. 
(2017/2018) – more than double that of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
– it is among the largest government institutions.  
Among its sub-institutions are the Pusat Da’wah Islamiah (propaga-
tion centre), the Sharia Affairs Department (Jabatan Hal Ehwal Syariah), 
the Doctrine Control Unit (Bahagian Kawalan Aqidah), and many other 
offices (classified into jabatan, pejabat, bahagian, unit, and institut). The 
current Minister, Badaruddin Othman, was among the “creator(s) of 
MIB” (Kershaw 2001: 19).13  
Like other market-inspired religious institutions translating Islam in-
to the globalised languages of bureaucracy and marketisation (on Malay-
sian Sharia Courts, see Peletz 2015), the MoRA has formalised a “vision 
and mission” (visi dan misi). The “vision” includes “strengthening of the 
officiality (kerasmian) and practice of Islam as a straight and complete 
way of life […]”, its “mission” is to “support and protect Islam and its 
officiality through an effective and dynamic administration”. Both aim at 
the “development and prosperity of the state, based on Sharia Law, the 
Constitution, other laws, and the MIB philosophy” (Kementerian Hal 
Ehwal Ugama, translations). 
The State Mufti Department works under the Prime Minister’s (Sul-
tan’s) office. The Mufti is Brunei’s chief interpreter of Islam. His office 
holds the exclusive authority of issuing of fatwas (Islamic legal opinions) 
and transgressions are punishable with up to two years imprisonment 
under the Syariah Penal Code Order 2013 (Perintah Kanun Hukuman Je-
nayah Syari’ah, 2013, henceforth SPCO, Section 228). Whereas fatwas 
elsewhere are most often non-binding advisory opinions, the State Muf-
ti’s fatwas enjoy the force of state law. They are binding on Shafi’i Mus-
lims in Brunei, which all Brunei Malays are legally expected to be, once 
the Sultan or MUIB order them to be published in the Gazette (RCKCA, 
Section 43; SPCO, Section 228). Mocking or insulting these fatwas can 
result in imprisonment (SPCO, Section 220). Printing/publishing/sell-
ing/importing books containing instructions, doctrinal positions or fat-
was “contrary to […] any lawfully issued fatwa” by the State Mufti is 
punishable by jail terms or fines (RCKCA, Section 188). Spreading doc-
trines “contrary to” state-interpreted Sharia Law is punishable with up to 
five years (SPCO, Section 207).  
The State Mufti regularly explains doctrinal views on matters of dai-
ly life, often in response to citizens requesting a fatwa, sometimes on 
                                                 
13  He was involved in a controversial gender-separation at the Prophet’s Mu-
hammad’s birthday celebrations in 1985, enacted without the Sultan’s consent, 
followed by an “ambassadorial exile” (Kershaw 2001: 19). 
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television. His office’s Friday prayer sermons (khutbah), read in all 
mosques, frequently address and justify government policies and remind 
the public of its religious duty to support the government. The bureau-
cracy conceptualises the Sultan as the leader of the Muslim believers (ulil 
amri) and khalifah (Allah’s vice-regent) in Brunei. This points to the reli-
gious dimension of the reciprocal relationship between the Sultan and 
his subjects. As Siti Norkhalbi (2005: 247) concluded, “the people sus-
tain their obedience and loyalty to the ruler, as obeying and being loyal to 
the ruler is part of obeying Allah’s commands”.  
The MoRA, the State Mufti Department and the MIB Supreme 
Council are the authoritative forces in producing the BoI’s official – that 
is, doctrinal and textually formalised – meanings (which, of course, also 
unfold beyond textual language). These official meanings are related to, 
but must be distinguished from, its social meanings that social actors as-
cribe to and derive from the official discourse (equally transcending text, 
although this cannot be substantially addressed here).  
The Firewall of MIB and its Supernatural  
Counterforces 
As the Bruneian scholar Asiyah az-Zahra Ahmad Kumpoh (2011: 39) 
put it, somewhat paradoxically, in post-colonial Brunei the “status of 
religious tolerance [...] remained unchanged” but there have been “cul-
tural changes where activities […] which did not conform to Islamic 
teaching could no longer be tolerated”. This may be a logical contradic-
tion for uninitiated outsiders (“tolerance unchanged” vs. “can no longer 
be tolerated”) but for many Bruneians it is not. It sums up two locally 
powerful themes. The first is feeling misrepresented by the outside (es-
pecially Western) world as intolerant/radical, whereas in reality, Bruneian 
Islam would be “moderate” and oriented towards “harmonious” rela-
tions with everybody. The second is the banning of supernatural tradi-
tions that long have been and often remain central to Malay everyday life. 
The latter, in the now hegemonic logic, is not a question of freedom of 
religious practice and thus (potentially) tolerable, but of protecting the 
very essence of Islam and Muslim souls facing Judgement Day. The 
following sections address this second theme. 
In 2015, the Sultan made a locally much-cited comment that the 
MIB was a “firewall” against unwanted elements. These include crime, 
social ills, and undesired cultural flows invading Brunei from abroad if 
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no “firewall” separating “positive” and “negative” influences were in 
place.14 The underlying idea of this digital metaphor points to a long-
standing view contrasting Brunei Darussalam (Abode of Peace) with a “zone 
of disorder” (Braighlinn 1992: 51, 57) abroad. Undesired “external” 
elements are not just alternative readings of Islam, militant groups/ideo-
logies, non-Muslim missionaries, and “immoral” or “Westernised” be-
haviours – they also pertain to “widely accepted symbolism(s)” of the 
supernatural, which are deeply rooted in the Malay “cultural vocabulary” 
(to borrow Herzfeld’s notions).  
One such tradition that Asiyah az-Zahra (2011: 50) mentions as no 
longer tolerable are “[c]elebrations at spirit shrines”, such as “powerful 
graves” (Müller 2018). A red line is crossed where Muslims attempt to 
contact the deceased or other spirits as intermediaries to convey wishes 
to God, nowadays considered a sin (syirik) that leads to divine punish-
ments, and generally where uncontrolled ceremonies are held at such 
places. 
The Islamic bureaucracy conceptualises the state as a protector of 
Muslim souls: It is obliged and accountable towards God to realise the 
principle of “enjoining good and forbidding wrong” (amar makruf dan 
nahi mungkar). Nowadays, the Malay mainstream similarly views many 
banned traditions as either deviant or outdated. This view was fostered 
by state-Islamic education, but also takes inspiration from bottom-up 
trends of Islamic resurgence, which have transformed ways of being 
Muslim across the Malay world, also (albeit to lesser extents) in countries 
without similar policies.  
Other deviant-declared practices are certain Malay customs (adat) in 
fields like wedding ceremonies (Abdul Mufidah 2014), dances, and dress. 
A khutbah (Mosque Affairs Department 2015) recently told Muslims not 
to shake hands with members of the opposite sex who are not their 
spouses or certain relatives (mahram) – an instruction that many, includ-
ing state elites, ignored,15 and which is not enforced. In other fields, the 
bureaucracy takes action. A striking example is supernatural special-
ists/healers (bomoh). Their status has changed from “an indispensable 
figure in a Malay village” whose existence was largely “taken for granted” 
(Mohd Taib 1988: 157, note the same wording as the Handelman and 
Shamgar-Handelman’s and Eickelman’s cited above) to a shadowy crim-
                                                 
14  Globalisation as a threat has always been a theme in MIB literature. 
15  A digital voice tongue-in-cheek asked whether “girls that shaked (sic) hands 
with Sultan should be sent to religious camp to wash their sins” (<www.reddit. 
com/r/Brunei/comments/3dsijn/imam_dont_shake_hands_with_nonmahram
_people/>). 
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inal figure who engages in syirik (sin) and khurafat (forbidden supersti-
tion). Although the “indigenous institution”16 of bomoh has long been 
widely accepted, under the MIB State’s claim to classificatory power, it 
can, officially and under that term, no longer be tolerated, resulting in far-
reaching changes in Malay everyday lifeworlds. Bomoh, as a social institu-
tion, and certain individuals in particular have always been surrounded by 
ambivalence, due to their simultaneously fascinating and suspicious ac-
cess to invisible worlds (Peletz 1993: 155). Now, however, this ambiva-
lence has been restructured and revalorised vis-à-vis state policies that 
aim to govern individual practices and beliefs, and in ways that pay more 
heed to the negative side of things. Thus, this socio-legal transformation 
pushed forward by bureaucratic religious actors is not a historical rupture 
per se, although the changes at play are dramatic. 
Social Imaginaries and Bureaucratised  
Representations of Black Magic 
Notwithstanding these normative shifts, beliefs in the omnipresent 
workings of sorcery (sihir) are still a social reality, as this section will eth-
nographically illustrate. During a car ride in 2017, a married couple of 
two religiously observant Bruneians, both postgraduate students, whom I 
had known for years, shared their personal experiences with me. Neither 
were inclined to any deviance in the MIB State’s sense, had temporarily 
lived abroad, and one had taught MIB before. Like most Bruneians I 
spoke with, they were convinced of the powers of sorcery and possible 
interferences of spirits (jin/hantu). “I have seen it with my own eyes”, 
Tijah told me. In her youth, she saw a “fireball”, assumedly caused by a 
form of sorcery called ranggau, at the sky. Others had seen it too, and her 
father told her to come into the house immediately. Such fireballs, she 
explained, are known to be the result of the workings of sorcerers (tukang 
sihir) – specifically (non-Muslim) Iban, but any sorcerer could learn it. 
Tijah recalled her father saying that when such a ball is nearby, a person 
will be harmed or die. The fireball would be related to a spirit controlled 
by the sorcerer, which must be fed with human lives. Tijah had seen 
such fireballs twice. Other interlocutors confirmed the concept’s exist-
ence in social imaginaries. 
                                                 
16  In 1988, Mohd Taib Osman (1988: 174, 168) noted that, in Malaysia, “bomohs 
enjoy comparative freedom from the sanctions of the religious authorities”, 
adding “without a bomoh, the village community is felt to be incomplete”. 
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The couple narrated several such stories. Her husband, Mamat, later 
stated that a generation earlier, the cause for such phenomena, and pro-
tection against it, had been the bomoh’s domain. Thanks to “better educa-
tion”, this was now known to be syirik, especially by the younger genera-
tion (whom I call the MIB generation). Both emphasised that orthodox 
Islam, as they learned it, confirms the reality of sorcery, evidenced by the 
Quran and hadith. In an attempt to provide legitimate evidence, they (and 
other interlocutors) stressed that even the Prophet Muhammad had once 
been under a spell (disihirkan). This reflects state-Islamic positions.  
MoRA officers showed me two exhibitions of confiscated objects 
used by both “real” and “fake” sorcerers in 2014. At first, all objects had 
been “cleaned” by a high-ranking Ustaz, as Khairul, the officer who 
showed me the exhibition, told me – yet, strange sounds were said to 
have come from the room after dark, and nobody would enter it at night. 
Khairul also narrated how a MoRA scholar had “tested” a confiscated 
talisman (azimat) for “academic” purposes, and “it worked, he was not 
able to cut into his skin!” Such experiments, he added, were dangerous 
for anyone’s soul.  
In the late 2000s, this theme room, entitled “Objects Leading to the 
Deviation from the True Doctrine (Aqidah)” (translation), was opened 
within a larger exhibition at the MoRA’s premises. It became the most 
popular room. The purpose was pedagogical; that is, to explain “what is 
prohibited, what you cannot do, and cannot sell”. Khairul added, “20 
years ago, Islamic education was not as strong as now”. In particular, 
some elders (warga emas) would still trust bomohs and practice deviant 
traditions, although this would gradually change since the 1990s (infor-
mal conversation, Bandar Seri Begawan, 8 October 2014). 
Some of the exhibited objects had been used, for example, to pro-
tect their owners from other people’s magic, to increase business profits, 
for love magic, and to become temporarily invisible or invincible. There 
were protective bottles with mystical symbols, numbers and Arabic let-
ters that “offenders” place above doors, and cooking/eating bowls with 
inscribed chants/numbers, kept in restaurants to enhance revenues (Fig-
ures 3 and 4).  
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Figure 3. “Exhibition of Objects Leading to the Deviation from the True 
Doctrine (akidah)”. Ministry of Religious Affairs, Islamic Da’wah 
Centre, Bandar Seri Begawan 
 
Source:  Picture by Dominik M. Müller, 2014. 
Some restaurant owners had been elderly Malays “who still believe in 
such methods”. Khairul himself had investigated such a case, although 
elders would stop once they were “strongly” exposed to the “right in-
formation”. He added another anecdote: A “very religious” restaurant 
customer realised his drinking glass was cracked. A newly ordered one 
cracked again (altogether four times). The “disgusting” reason was that 
“the restaurant owner had used najis (excrements) on his dishes” for 
magic purposes. God, I was told, may protect pious persons in such 
moments. 
Other objects are protective rings, often found in a suspicious mix; 
for example, wrapped in yellow cloth, indicating usage for worshipping 
(alat pemujiaan). When such objects are found at post offices or border 
posts (“often” sent by/for foreign domestic helpers) or confiscated lo-
cally, they are sent to the MoRA for investigation. Some are “harmless” 
and others are “used for special purposes, although the owners them-
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selves often don’t exactly know what” (ibid.). Normally, no legal action is 
taken, but they remain confiscated. 
Figure 4. Confiscated Objects Assumedly Used for Magic Practices, on 
Exhibition for Educational Purposes. Ministry of Religious Affairs, 
Islamic Da’wah Centre, Bandar Seri Begawan 
 
Source: Picture by Dominik M. Müller, 2014. 
At the second exhibition, officers showed me pictures of a graveyard 
where photographs of a target person of sorcery had been buried, 
wrapped in underwear. They regularly find pictures in other settings, 
such as in vases. An officer joked “we confiscate so many, we sometimes 
know the people on them, possibly it’s one of us!” (informal conversa-
tion, Bandar Seri Begawan, 18 October 2014) (Figure 5). This concerns 
many Bruneians: An MIB officer told me how friends recommended 
that he not put a photograph on his Facebook profile as it could be used 
by enemies (informal conversation, Gadong, January 2017). 
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Figure 5. A Picture that Went Viral in Brunei Darussalam in 2015,  
Reportedly Used to “Harm” a Civil Servant Named “Hassan” 
through “Black Magic”, Confiscated by Religious Authorities 
 
Source:  Social media. 
Arif, a “doctrine control” officer explained that there are no written 
guidelines regarding what defines a good bomoh and a bad bomoh – theo-
retically their “practice can be good if it is not against Islam”. If a hospi-
tal is far away, a “good bomoh” (who, Arif added, should rather be called 
orang pandai) might provide helpful herbs. However, even well-intent-
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ioned bomoh/orang pandai would often unintendedly engage spirits/dem-
ons. I did not find any consensus, either among my bureaucratic inter-
locutors or elsewhere, about what defines the difference between bomoh 
and orang pandai, and whether they are necessarily “deviant” (sesat). The 
tendency was to categorically view bomoh as deviant (reflecting the tone in 
state-media), and orang pandai more undecidedly with mixed suspicion 
and admiration. Bruneian bomoh do not call themselves bomoh anymore, 
as the term has acquired a de-legitimising stigma. Some are called Cikgu 
or Ustaz (teacher), albeit in one case, a more daring underground healer, 
who unsurprisingly became investigated, extravagantly called himself 
Yang Keramat Agong (“holding superior powers”). 
Arif argued that bomoh were “already established” and advertise their 
work, whereas orang pandai were “quiet”, would “not reveal themselves”, 
and were more concerned with healing, contrasting the bomoh’s broader 
repertoire (although I know a counter-example). Arif estimated “hun-
dreds” of bomoh in Brunei, “70 to 80 per cent foreigners”, mainly Indo-
nesians. Local bomoh were mostly elders (“kampung people”), who learned 
“from generation to generation”, and whose often-unintended deviance 
was mainly about interacting with jin. No generation followed the family 
transmission pattern any longer. Local suspects in their thirties and for-
ties were often “fake bomoh” engaging in financial or sexual exploitation.  
For many students, exchanging supernatural stories is part of their 
daily life. Ramlee shared with me hearsay, of which he appeared con-
vinced, about a certain Prince having a room for his dagger (keris) collec-
tion that was haunted (bilik panas). One keris “stood in the room”, haunt-
ed by “several spirits” (including a sea spirit, hantu laut) causing troubled 
family relations. The Prince, following the narration, called an Indone-
sian “good bomoh” who “cleaned” the room, performed prayers (baca doa) 
and brought away the keris, refusing any payment. Ramlee added that 
some people believed the Prince himself has “powers”; “he can walk up 
walls, like Spiderman!” Ramlee also shared a story (known by other inter-
locutors) that the Sultan’s father had supernatural powers (“like other 
Sultans before”) and could control the rain by twisting his moustache 
(informal conversation, July 2017). Indeed, some royal graves were 
popularly considered “powerful” (keramat) in the past. One, Makam Di 
Luba, is still rumoured to be haunted and, according to MoRA officers 
occasionally visited by “deviants”. 
The main institution responsible for “controlling” religious deviance 
is the MoRA’s Doctrine Control Unit (Bahagian Kawalan Aqidah). It or-
ganises surveillance, arrests (with other enforcement agencies), “faith 
rehabilitation,” and maintains a confidential 24-hour hotline. Formed in 
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1986, it has undergone several restructurings (Müller 2015: 328). Follow-
ing public calls to report suspects, 38 bomoh were arrested in 2004 and 55 
in 2005. Later unpublished statistics list smaller numbers, but arrests 
continued.  
I interviewed Razak, who spied on a bomoh’s community for the au-
thorities, acting as his helper and disciple. He has an attractive private 
sector job and narrated his motivation as ethical: As the bomoh was cheat-
ing, and spiritually harming his patients and disciples, he viewed spying 
as a civic duty. He thus fulfils the government’s expectations for MIB 
subjects to co-produce and strengthen the MIB state’s classificatory 
power as “multipliers” in society.  
Bomoh cases are normally settled outside of courts, through warnings 
and “voluntary” re-education called counselling (kaunseling). Its legal basis 
has long been the RCKCA (Section 186, “False Doctrine”). In 2014, Arif 
emphasised that, if enacted, the SPCO would make prosecution easier: 
Muslims worshipping “any person, place, nature or any object, thing or 
animal in any manner” contrary to Islamic Law, or making “(a)n act or 
statement that shows faith to any object, thing or animal” possessing 
“power,” “for example the ability to bring good luck, increas(ing) wealth, 
grant(ing) wishes, heal(ing) diseases and others”, could be sentenced to 
imprisonment, fines and counselling. Muslims who claim that they “or 
any other person knows an event or a matter that is beyond human un-
derstanding”, contradicting Islamic teachings, can receive ten years’ im-
prisonment, caning, and forced repentance. Advertising black magic is 
punishable by up to five years’ imprisonment; attempted murder through 
black magic with 10 years, and fulfilled murder with the death penalty 
(Sections 152, 153, 206b, 208, 2016). The SPCO is enacted in three stag-
es, and severe punishments will only be enforced in the not-yet-enacted 
second and third stages.17 Even then, there would be high procedural 
burdens and mechanisms to avoid the punishment. 
                                                 
17  The SPCO’s implementation is in its first phase (Müller 2017). The second 
phase is scheduled to begin 12 months after the additional Syariah Criminal 
Procedure Code (“CPC Syariah”) has been gazetted. After long preparations, 
during which the Sultan publicly criticised the Ministry of Religious Affairs and 
Attorney General’s Chambers for slow progress, the CPC has been finalised 
and “consented” by the Sultan as of March 2018. Despite stating it will be im-
plemented as scheduled, the Minister of Religious Affairs also alluded to some 
further temporal flexibility, pointing to the enormous logistical challenge of 
implementing such a far-reaching legal reform and restructuring judicial and en-
forcement procedures (Pelita Brunei 2018; Dewan Majlis 2018: 6ff.), aspects that 
have likely been initially underestimated (cf. Müller 2017).  
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Sharia-Compliant Healing, Japanese Water-
Crystal Photography and the State-Controlled 
Reconfiguration of Deviant-Declared Practices  
Parallel to the outlawing and social marginalisation of bomoh, Brunei 
witnessed the rise of “Sharia-compliant” Islamic healing and exorcism 
(ruqyah syariah/pengubatan Islam). State-ulama have long conducted such 
practices (sometimes officially, sometimes unofficially), but the most 
insightful example for my analytic purposes, and the biggest local trend, 
is Darusysyifa’ Warrafahah, an institution legally established in Brunei in 
2007. Its model was the Malaysian Darusyifa’, led by the late Haron Din, 
a former Islamic Studies professor who held prestigious degrees from 
Egypt, and Spiritual Leader of the Islamic Party of Malaysia. Until his 
death in 2016, Haron Din was Malaysia’s most prominent expert of the 
invisible world: his books were bestsellers, his institution expanded 
throughout Malaysia, and he was admired across religious-political di-
vides.  
Many Bruneians admired Haron Din too, including an aspiring 
small group of Bruneians who came in touch with him and gradually 
developed the idea of establishing a local branch. Haron Din repeatedly 
visited Brunei, in some cases upon the Sultan’s invitation, and was ac-
cepted (“cleared”) by Brunei’s Islamic bureaucracy, the MUIB in particu-
lar, to teach and speak locally about Islam-related matters, which is re-
markable, considering he was a foreign politician and religious scholar, 
and shows the respect he enjoyed among Bruneian religious elites. 
As one of the founders narrated to me, it took some time before 
they were finally able to establish the institution as an association, which 
legally had to be done through the Registrar of Organisations (ROS), a 
complex procedure that goes along with a range of requirements and 
obligations. The group had to learn about this first, but finally succeeded 
and received permission and set up Darusysyifa’ Warrafahah – a non-
state Islamic organisation, which is highly unusual in Brunei. De facto 
Haron Din was its supreme teacher, but pro forma it became an independ-
ent local organisation. Its “governing committee” reports all activities to 
the ROS, and the organisational structure follows the ROS’s obligatory 
pattern. The original group of founders consisted of 20 people, from 
both genders, of diverse educational and professional backgrounds, rang-
ing from government employees, retirees, and private sector workers to 
housewives – some of whom held PhD degrees and others who had 
primary school education. Despite this diversity, however, they all were 
literate in reciting the Qur’an, as a founding member emphasised. 
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Brunei’s Darusysyifa’ offers a standardised one-year curriculum 
course on the “basics of Islamic healing” (Kursus Asas Perubatan Islam), 
using Haron Din’s writings. Students learn purpose-specific Quranic 
verses, recitation patterns and “ethics”. Their certificate (tauliah mudawi/ 
sijil pengijazahan) entitles them to practice as volunteers at the centre 
and/or privately. In 2014, 500 people were actively involved, from di-
verse backgrounds, but all were necessarily Muslims. Patients also in-
cluded non-Muslims, such as Chinese Bruneians, Filipino and Thai guest 
workers, and a local Japanese manager who hired Darusysyifa’ after 
“many disturbances” in his company. The number of certified Islamic 
healers (perawat Islam18) and treated patients/places grew annually (Fig-
ures 6 to 9).  
Figure 6. Number of Patients Treated by Darusysyifa’ Warrafahah  
Annually in Brunei Darussalam 
 
Source:  Courtesy of Darusysyifa’ Warrafahah. 
  
                                                 
18  Darusysyifa’ distinguishes mudawi (also perawat/“medical practitioner”) and 
musa’id (also pembantu perawat/“assistant”). Mudawi undergo 90 hours training.  
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Figure 7. Number of Healers Certified by Darusysyifa’ Warrafahah  
Annually in Brunei Darussalam 
 
Source:  Courtesy of Darusysyifa’ Warrafahah. 
Figure 8. Number of “Disturbed” Houses/Offices Treated by Darusysyifa’ 
Warrafahah Annually in Brunei Darussalam 
 
Source:  Courtesy of Darusysyifa’ Warrafahah. 
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Figure 9. Number of Cases of Disturbances (Individual Level) Treated by 
Darusysyifa’ Warrafahah Annually in Brunei Darussalam 
 
Source:  Courtesy of Darusysyifa’ Warrafahah. 
Darusysyifa’ categorises three treatment fields: Physical (for example, 
headache, migraine, flu), spiritual/emotional (rohani/emosi) (for example, 
insomnia, problems with neighbours, anxieties, searching a husband/ 
wife, “weak spirit” (lemah semangat)), and “disturbances” (gangguan). “Dis-
turbances” are caused by jin and/or sorcery, affect individuals or places/ 
buildings, and may result in possession (kerasukan) or “hysteria” (histeria). 
They may also be manifested by poisoning (santau), a classical bomoh tool 
in Malay social imaginaries (Peletz 1988). Sometimes, jin accompany 
people, some consciously own and feed them, until “in the end, the jin 
owns them” (group interview with Darusysyifa’ representatives, 8 Octo-
ber 2014). Jin ownership can also be hereditary. An indication of disturb-
ances is difficulty in reciting Quranic verses that one normally knows. 
During exorcism, Muslim jin would often leave the body “if they are told 
in Islamic terms, but not always!” Infidel jin (jin kafir) are considered 
even more challenging, but they can convert, which is central to exor-
cism strategies. One should avoid speaking with them (“they lie the 
whole time”), but if they express willingness to convert, healers must 
assist. 
Jin speaking through possessed patients happened “twice each week” 
in 2014. More frequent disturbances are not manifested by alien voices. 
“Often there is no clear identification of the cause: jin, syaitan, we don’t 
want to know, what counts is successful healing!” In the Japanese man-
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ager’s case, company workers had seen legs flying and headless people 
(“like in the movies, it’s the same!”, a Darusysyifa’ member explained19). 
Such scenes were “very common” (compare Ong 1987). Some solutions 
are immediate; some treatments take months. 
When I visited the centre one evening in 2014, all 10 treatment 
rooms were occupied. I witnessed a “disturbance”: Maryam’s sister had 
tried to heal her “by copying Darusysyifa’ without knowing the right 
method, then a jin became involved”, a healer explained. Black spots 
emerged on Maryam’s skin, and she went to Darusysyifa’. A female heal-
er exorcised Maryam, who made long buzzing noises before throwing up 
(the material outcome of which is normally disposed at a nearby river) 
when the jin assumedly left her body, a pattern the healer expected. I was 
told that because this is a dangerous moment, Darusysyifa’ healers (and 
their families) must use protection. In its previous smaller building, spir-
its “sometimes jumped from one person to the next”. The situation 
improved after the Darusysyifa’ clinic was enlarged, with partitions to 
provide enclosed treatment spaces (Figure 10).  
After the exorcism, Maryam received a mixture of mashed herbal 
leaves and rice powder to shower with at home. Medicines can be pur-
chased but are free for patients. In most other cabins, counselling took 
place for issues such as social/family problems, to be solved by Quranic 
rather than traditional bomoh means. Many patients visited bomoh before 
they came, a healer stated. Common advice is to pray the right prayers in 
the right way, remember Allah, and observe Islamic norms for social be-
haviour.  
 
  
                                                 
19  On equations of experienced supernatural events with films (“it was exactly like 
in Ghosts”) and their intimate relationship, see van de Port 2006. 
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Figure 10. A Certified Darusysyifa’ Healer Treating a Woman Assumed to 
Be “Disturbed”. Kampong Manggis, Brunei Darussalam 
 
Source:  Picture by Dominik M. Müller, 2014. 
Darusysyifa’ also exorcises state buildings, such as university buildings, 
the national hospital (Darusysyifa’ 2011) and, during my visit, an Arabic 
school for girls that had been closed following a “mass-hysteria/posses-
sion” (Brunei Times 2014),20 some of which has been reported on by local 
                                                 
20  In 2010, a “mass hysteria” hit three schools during examinations time. Even 
“teachers” and “the school’s cook” were “possessed”, before Darusysyifa’ and 
the Institut Tahfiz Al-Quran solved it (Borneo Bulletin 2010). At one school, even 
non-Muslim students received “religious treatments”. At another, the “hysteria” 
started when a “student cried after seeing a spirit”. A teacher commented 
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media. Darusysyifa’s first graduation ceremony in 2010 took place at a 
Ministry of Defence building. In return, Darusysyifa’ cleaned it. Disturb-
ances had occurred, particularly after dawn: A solider “heard somebody 
calling him, found somebody sitting at a table, asked why he had called 
him, suddenly the person was gone!” During the exorcism, “a door 
opened and closed by itself, but not in the direction in which it would 
have been pushed by the wind, the other direction! Banners at the wall 
were shaking, a lamp stopped working”. After the exorcism, the “dis-
turbances” stopped (group interview with Darusysyifa’ representatives, 8 
October 2014). 
Darusysyifa’ also cleaned the Friendship Bridge to Malaysia before 
its opening. A worker had approached a car (“an old Honda Accord”) on 
the not-yet-opened bridge, occupied by a man and a child. When he 
asked what they were doing there, the car suddenly vanished (group 
interview with Darusysyifa’ representatives, 8 October 2014).  
But Darusysyifa’s engagement with state power goes beyond state-
prescribed bureaucratic forms and cleaning jobs. When the first healers 
graduated, the Sultan himself launched a Darusysyifa’ event at the Con-
vention Centre. Prince Malik, the Sultan’s son, became Darusysyifa’ 
patron. Princes Sufri and Jefri, the Sultan’s brothers, also visited Darusy-
syifa’ events (Darusysyifa’ 2013: 12). These visits expressed royal en-
dorsement and provided the locally most powerful form of symbolic 
capital. Photographs in Darusysyifa’ annual reports documented this 
legitimation of the highest order.  
Those of Darusysyifa’s graduation reports that were available to me 
(2010, 2011, 2013) share a similar structure: A full-page portrait of His 
Majesty on the first page (in 2010 preceded by Quranic verses) and 
Prince Malik on the second. In 2013, the third page carried a text thank-
ing Prince Malik and emphasising popular “trust” in Darusysyifa’, adding 
that “the people” now turn away from bomoh. In one report (2010: 8), a 
picture shows Harun Din standing next to the Sultan, the Crown Prince, 
and Prince Malik, symbolising the foreign Islamic scholar’s royal ac-
ceptance. A picture of the State Mufti on the same page symbolised the 
Islamic bureaucracy’s equally crucial endorsement. In 2009 the Mufti, 
who himself writes about Islamic healing (Abdul Aziz 2012), inaugurated 
                                                                                                    
“(i)ronically, the spirit also made several demands. But the religious expert from 
Tahfiz Institute told us not to meet the demands as it was the voice of Satan” 
(ibid.) The acting Minister of Education “advised the school authorities to clean 
the restrooms, believed to be the favorite spot for the spirits and the school 
environment”, which illustrates that controlling the invisible world is a state af-
fair of high priority. 
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the year’s course with a speech. Some course events were held on the 
MoRA’s premises (Pelita Brunei 2016), which underlines its proximity 
(“blurring boundaries”) to the state’s BoI. The Darusysyifa’ leaders I 
spoke with stressed their contribution to MIB and the Sultan’s goal of 
Brunei as Negara Zikir (“a nation that always remembers Allah”) under 
his Vision 2035.21 Through all these references to and cooperation with 
state power, Darusysyifa’ performatively stages its conformity with the 
MIB State’s normative expectations, expressed through powerful sym-
bolic codes in a Brunei-specific cultural vocabulary. It is a necessary condi-
tion for its existence to co-produce the MIB State’s classificatory power 
in society, yet its leaders also passionately believe in that project. But 
through the very act of establishing Darusysyifa’, they not only repro-
duce state power but also inform some of its meanings in ways that were 
neither originally planned nor expected by the architects of the govern-
ment’s BoI, resulting from the creative agency of individuals who appro-
priate symbolic state power for their own purposes. 
Unlike the earlier cited MoRA officer, the Darusysyifa’ interlocutors 
assumed that bomohs were “always negative”: “for example, when they 
say a prayer, the last part is not correct, they always twist verses [through 
which evil powers become involved]”. Yes, “white bomoh” and “black 
bomoh” would exist, and some “do not know they practise the wrong 
way”, but “in the end they are all the same, they use the powers of syaitan 
and jin”. Some certificate holders are ex-bomoh: “Some admit it openly”, 
but Darusysyifa’ would not ask about “earlier mistakes”, following 
Haron Din’s advice not to expose sins. They believed that the role of 
bomoh was declining due to Darusysyifa’s work, state education, and the 
MoRA’s dakwah. As one representative stated enthusiastically, “now 
there is an alternative!” 
There is clearly demand for these practices. A local academic told 
me how his father had practised traditional healing in the family before 
attending Darusysyifa’s course to learn the “proper” way. Just like for-
mer bomoh, people like him can purify and re-legitimise their work vis-à-
vis hegemonic power-structures, and simultaneously protect their souls. 
                                                 
21  Darusysyifa’ members narrated how the Sultan saw a possessed girl at a school 
in 2005, asking the jin: “Why do you possess her? Get out of this girl!” He was 
successful, “because he is the khailfah”. He has powers, not only over humans, 
over everything, over all makhluk (creations) in his country”. They added: Some 
loggers tell trees, themselves makhluk, creations of Allah, they have the Sultan’s 
permission (compare Skeat 1900: 194!). A video exists of the school incident 
(<www.youtube.com/watch?v=Do9b-ZtFNRs>), excluding the narrated de-
tails.  
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The strong interest in the services previously provided by bomoh/orang 
pandai, and now by Darusysyifa’, results from requirements that have not 
disappeared. Peletz (1993: 150) described sorcery and consulting super-
natural specialists in Malaysia as “counterparts of formal social exchange” 
relating to personal vulnerabilities and “concerns with autonomy and 
social control”. Supernatural knowledge (ilmu) entails “power to influ-
ence other people and to maintain one’s autonomy in the face of coun-
tervailing forces invoked by others who aim to limit it”, particularly “in 
societies in which one never really knows what is in the minds of others”. 
In the MIB State, the normative parameters for handling such anxieties 
have shifted, resulting in a gap that Darusysyifa’, with its ethically puri-
fied and bureaucratically certified services, offers to fill.  
However, MoRA’s officers stated that “not everything labeled Da-
rusysyifa’” was unproblematic; for example, an arrested bomoh had falsely 
claimed holding a certificate to practice. And even certified healers 
would “not all practice the right way”. One had inappropriately touched 
a woman, claiming that a jin made him do it. Another bomoh brought a 
real certificate to a kaunseling session to prove his innocence, but had 
misused it. Some “turn to the wrong direction again after a few years”. 
Darusysyifa’ was not to be blamed, though, and the MoRA generally 
welcomes its work (interview with MoRA representatives, Bandar Seri 
Begawan, 8 October 2014). However, these individual cases of transgres-
sion indicate yet other modes of creating agency by (mis-)appropriating 
state-approved symbolic codes; namely by (false) reference to Da-
rusysyifa’ and the authorising powers its certification system provides. 
Darusysyifa’ healers work voluntarily and provide their services for 
free. Patients “can donate if they wish” and “pay as much as they like”. 
Bomoh and orang pandai typically use the same wording. Darusysyifa’ is 
funded by donations, but also sells products exposed to prayers (dizikir-
kan), such as herbs, coconut oil, and honey. This, too, presents a paradox: 
an uneven continuation of bomoh practices of praying into natural prod-
ucts such as water, although Darusysyifa’ views these as entirely different: 
one realises divine normativity through authentic verses, the other en-
gages demonic forces, either through lacking education, or on purpose. 
Its bestselling item during my fieldwork was prayed-upon healing water, 
large boxes of which were stored at its premises (Figures 11 and 12).  
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Figure 11. Pictures of Water-Crystals (“Before” and “After Having Been 
Exposed to Prayers”, and “zam-zam Water”) Placed at the 
Walls of Darusysyifa’ Warrafahah’s Headquarters. Kampong 
Manggis, Brunei Darussalam 
 
Source:  Picture by Dominik M. Müller, 2014. 
When I sat together with Darusysyifa’ representatives in a room (“for 
authorised personnel only”), they showed me a PowerPoint Presentation 
visualising the powers of their healing water through microscopic photo-
graphs of water crystals. Darusysyifa’ had sent frozen samples of differ-
ent types to a non-Muslim Japanese water photographer, Masaru Emoto 
(1943–2014). Emoto was internationally renowned among esoteric cir-
cles for his water experiments. In academia, his work is widely dismissed 
as pseudo-scientific, to which he once responded his work was merely 
art. For my interlocutors, however, it possessed academic character.22 
  
                                                 
22  Emoto also served as a reference for the Indonesian preacher Aa Gym, where 
he “wisely tailored his presentation to address Islam” (Hoesterey 2016: 82). 
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Figure 12. Healing Products (That Have Been Exposed to Prayers, sudah 
dizikirkan) on Sale at Darusysyifa‘ Warrafahah’s Headquarters. 
Kampong Manggis, Brunei Darussalam 
 
Source: Picture by Dominik M. Müller, 2014. 
This added yet another powerful vocabulary of legitimation, which is 
inherent to the BoI: the quest for scientific evidence in the construction 
of facts (Latour and Woolgar 1979), and its importance for convincing 
others (Latour 1986: 5). 
Samples included average water, water exposed to “4444 prayers” 
(selawat tafrijiyah), water exposed to zikir prayers, and zam-zam water from 
Mecca. Emoto assumes that water “has a memory” that is acoustic and 
visual. Negative influences “break the micro-crystals” but water also 
“remembers” positive influences. Going beyond Emoto’s interpretive 
frame, my interlocutors stated that water is a “creation of Allah” (ma-
khluk Allah). Going beyond more common orthodox Sunni discourse, 
but appropriating Emoto’s ideas, they explained that water “can hear” 
and “has feelings”.  
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Emoto compared Darusysyifa’s samples with others, including wa-
ter exposed to rock music. He was “fascinated”, they told me, and the 
pictures left little doubt: Prayed-upon water exhibited the “most beauti-
ful” structures. Other samples had gradually less fine structures. The 
“heavy metal”-exposed water was the “worst”, “completely destroyed”. 
The crystals exposed to zikir prayers looked exceptional, but the tafriji-
yah-exposed water (4444 prayers, including by Haron Din) went even 
beyond that: “Emoto had never seen anything like that!” (ibid.) For Da-
rusysyifa’, Emoto’s pictures and the PowerPoint presentation visualised the 
invisible, and objectively proved their prayers’ effectiveness. The scientific 
character was also stressed at a Darusysyifa’ symposium in 2013, which 
Emoto and Haron Din came to Brunei to attend. Emoto presented a 
“working paper” entitled: “The Science of Beautiful Water”. The written 
programme, which referred to him as “Prof.” (he never held a university 
professorship23) described Emoto as a “scientific expert” (pakar saintis) 
presenting “scientific findings” (hasil kajian saintifik) (Simposium Air 
Cantik 2013). 
Pictures of water crystals decorated a wall inside Darusysyifa’s 
building, next to pictures of herbs. The back cover of its 2013 graduation 
report also showed water crystals. These crystals, and the ideas attached 
to them, had become part of Darusysyifa’s corporate culture, and of its 
culture of self-presentation towards interested outsiders.  
Darusysyifa’ sold tafrijiyah water for 70 BND cents (sen) per bottle 
(“some people now drink it every day”). It serves as a medicine, and for 
protection from harm or disturbances, which, in earlier days would have 
been done through talismans and/or related verses. To be effective, it 
should be used alongside particular prayers and firm belief. 
Somewhat related, an MIB officer whom I met in 2017 was said by 
a colleague to be a “very good healer”, “like an orang pandai”. He would 
also “read verses into water” and sometimes treated my interlocutor’s 
children. He would never be seen as a bomoh. Like him and Darusysyifa’, 
however, bomoh always used water (and oil) as a medium and prayed into 
it.24 From Darusysyifa’s perspective, any equation, or claiming a continu-
ity of “structures of thought that […] continue to provide an organizing 
framework” (Herzfeld), would be fundamentally misleading, with dan-
gerous consequences. 
                                                 
23  Emoto held a PhD from a controversial distance learning school in India. 
24  The caretaker of Singapore’s Habib Noh shrine similarly does this every day.  
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Concluding Remarks:  
Hybrid Pathways to Orthodoxy 
As a social phenomenon, the BoI in Brunei is deeply structured by the 
MIB State’s unique discursive substrate. Boundaries between state and 
society are in many ways made blurring through educational means, and 
by non-state actors themselves who appropriate the state’s powerful 
symbolic forms and bureaucratic schemes. Therefore, the BoI transcends 
its organisational boundaries and informs social and cultural transfor-
mations, as the state’s classificatory schemes diffuse into society and 
become actively embedded in everyday lifeworlds. 
As the case of Darusysyifa’ illustrates, such appropriations do not 
simply reproduce state power, but also serve to ascribe new meanings to 
it. The politics of self-declared orthodox purification become creatively 
re-embedded into both pre-existing cultural vocabularies and the discur-
sive arena of the nation state, while simultaneously drawing upon trans-
national cultural flows from multiple sources. Some deviant-declared 
practices become reinvented within the symbolic parameters of the MIB 
State, alongside the more universal languages of bureaucracy, cultural 
globalisation, modern nationalism, marketisation, scientisation, and sta-
tisticalisation, among other hybridised registers. This goes beyond what 
Herzfeld called “the organic part played by symbols in creating the new 
order out of the old”: The BoI, viewed as wider societal phenomenon, 
here also integrates a vertiginous mixture of other influences, such as 
Japanese water-crystal photography, the objectifying powers of Power-
Point, digital metaphors, future-oriented corporate governance, and 
transnational trends in pedagogy. Such accommodative reconfigurations 
should not be surprising, as they reflect a more general global condition. 
What makes the Bruneian case special, however, is how the MIB State, 
and “state actors” in the term’s expanded sense, passionately seek to 
purify local culture through zealous Islamisation policies, yet the path-
ways towards realising this orthodoxy are remarkably flexible and hybrid. 
Such micro-level negotiations of state power and Sharia-framed norma-
tivity – explored ethnographically by looking over the shoulders of in-
volved actors – tell a different story from the meta-narratives of Islami-
sation that dominate portrayals of Brunei and often narrowly draw upon 
official policies, government declarations, and legal provisions. In fact, 
the MIB State’s “firewall” of cultural protectionism is itself expressed 
through vocabularies of cultural globalisation and in multifold ways 
shaped by transnational forces that it cannot (entirely) control. 
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Bureaucratised thinking, speaking and planning, which goes hand in 
hand with translating Islam into the language of modern state bureaucra-
cy, informs the quest for objectified evidence-making, as manifested in 
Darusysyifa’s case or the MIB bureaucracy’s statistical success rates, 
“visions and missions” and five-year-plans, among other examples. The 
systematisation and reflection that Eickelman calls an “objectification of 
Muslim consciousness” form a necessary condition. In objectified modes 
of being Muslim, earlier practices and social institutions, such as the 
bomoh, are systematically re-examined vis-à-vis their (un)Islamicness. Yet, 
subsequent “abandonments” are themselves culturally productive endeav-
ours and should be analysed as such, instead of reproducing their self-
idealising logics by describing them in their own terms.25 
Although this article is primarily concerned with symbolic power, 
bureaucratised meaning-making and transformations coinciding with the 
nation-stateisation of Islam, the question of what drives the BoI remains 
debatable. While any reduction of variables inevitably violates the com-
plexity at stake, factors to consider include a bureaucratic quest for ra-
tionalisation26 intersecting with globalised marketisation, the rise of Is-
lamic legalism with its passions for taxonomical purity and cleansing 
(entailing other transnational trends subsumed under labels like the 
“conservative” or “punitive turn”), but also pedagogical aspirations for 
Islamic social engineering (Feener 2013). Similarly, what Scott (1998: 3) 
described as “state-simplifications” (“the basic givens of modern state-
craft”) surely informs any state-driven BoI (cf. Peletz 2015: 148), just as 
its inherent quest of eradicating spaces of informality – here especially 
unregulated spaces of bomoh healing27 – although, as I have illustrated in 
Darusysyifa’s case, related attempts at formalisation then give rise to new 
informalities. On these counts, we could, to a certain extent, adequately 
conclude that much of what we see in Brunei is common throughout 
                                                 
25  The alternative would be what Bourdieu (1994: 1) calls “the risk of taking over 
(or being taken over by) a thought of the state, i.e. of applying to the state cate-
gories of thought produced and guaranteed by the state”. 
26  To avoid misunderstandings, supernatural beliefs and practices can be perfectly 
rational; this insight dates back to Malinowski’s (1954: 86, 34) reflections on 
how “magic is fundamentally akin to science”, and I do not imply that bureau-
cratic rationalisation/objectification necessarily cause disenchantment or un-
dermine charisma (see Fogg in this special issue). Multifold cultural meanings 
can be bureaucratically empowered, including spirit beliefs, as Darusysyifa’s bu-
reaucratised exorcism illustrates. 
27  In an earlier phase of the socio-legal deviantisation of bomoh activities, calls had 
been made that “bomohs should register” (Borneo Bulletin 2001). From the mid-
2000s onwards, this issue was approached less ambiguously. 
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Southeast Asia (and indeed much of the world), including non-Muslim 
settings. After all, we might even declare the described case as yet anoth-
er manifestation of the “age of total bureaucratisation” (Graeber 2015: 
17), or “the bureaucratisation of the world in the neo-liberal era” (Hibou 
2015). Without denying the explanatory usefulness of such “broad-brush” 
approaches (but see Heyman’s 2004: 490ff. nuanced critique), I insist on 
not downplaying the hermeneutically productive and epistemically struc-
turing role of the MIB State’s very own, locally-unique discursive setting, 
and to take it seriously also on its terms. In a conventional functional (i.e. 
more narrowly power-, control-, and resources-oriented) analysis of bu-
reaucratised religion, realising shared characteristics such as those listed 
will likely dominate our conclusions, whereas a hermeneutic/particular-
istic analysis would rather emphasise more unique aspects inherent to 
precisely the same phenomena. Both conclusions are legitimate, they 
simply address different questions.  
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